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Crypto under siege

Взлом Coldcard выявил уязвимости аппаратного кошелька

Взлом Coldcard в 2026 году доказал, что даже автономные кошельки могут быть скомпрометированы, если недостатки прошивки позволяют злоумышленникам предсказывать фразы восстановления.
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The essentials
  • К 4 августа 2026 года 1596 BTC было украдено примерно с 7300 адресов.
  • Ошибка Coldcard использовала детерминированное программное обеспечение вместо аппаратного генератора случайных чисел для генерации начального числа.
  • Злоумышленники воссоздали закрытые ключи, не нуждаясь в устройствах или фразах восстановления пользователей.

The 2026 Coldcard breach shattered the belief that air-gapped hardware wallets are immune to hacking. The attack caused over $130 million in losses across three major attack phases and 14 minor incidents. The stolen amount involved about 1,596 BTC taken from approximately 7,300 affected Bitcoin addresses. This case proved that even offline storage doesn't fully protect funds if seed generation is not secure enough.

In contrast to common methods like phishing or device theft, the Coldcard vulnerability stemmed from a flaw in the firmware. A software bug introduced in March 2021 caused some Coldcard devices to use a deterministic pseudorandom number generator rather than the secure hardware-based random number generator they were designed to use. This mistake allowed attackers to predict recovery phrases, which are critical for accessing a wallet's funds.

Inside the Coldcard vulnerability

Security researchers explained that when a device's seed generation process lacks true randomness, attackers can attempt to guess all possible combinations. The Coldcard flaw made this attack much easier by allowing certain seed phrase outputs to be predicted. By matching these likely phrases to public blockchain data, attackers could find which generated addresses held valuable Bitcoin.

This vulnerability didn't require thieves to steal a physical device, connect to it remotely or trick the user into revealing sensitive information. The affected wallets remained offline, but the predictable nature of their seed phrases made them easy targets. While firmware updates could stop future vulnerable wallets from being created, they couldn't fix the seed phrases already generated with weak randomness. Funds had to be transferred to new wallets with properly secured seeds to be protected.

Broader hardware wallet risks

The Coldcard breach exposed several key vulnerabilities that extend beyond a single device or incident. These include flaws in firmware, predictable seed generation, phishing attempts for recovery phrases, the use of counterfeit hardware wallets and user errors that compromise security. One 2026 example highlighted how a fake Ledger device looked genuine but was designed to capture sensitive data from its owner.

Users who take photos of their recovery phrases or store them online are at high risk of exposing all their digital assets. Any hardware wallet that arrives with a pre-written recovery phrase should be destroyed immediately. Legitimate wallet providers never request recovery phrases through online forms, emails or applications. Users who provide these phrases to untrusted sources risk losing all their funds.

Even when hardware wallets are kept in secure environments, they are still software-based devices running code. A single mistake in the firmware can impact thousands of users. The Coldcard incident demonstrated how a flaw in seed generation, which is a foundational part of wallet security, can lead to massive financial losses despite the device's offline nature.

Coldcard's design included an air-gapped transaction signing process meant to prevent direct attacks on the physical device. However, attackers achieved their goal by exploiting the predictable seed generation algorithm, rather than trying to access the wallet itself. This proved that mathematically weak systems can undermine even the strongest physical security measures in the cryptocurrency world.

Beyond firmware flaws and predictable seed generation, hardware wallets face other risks that users often overlook. Phishing attacks can trick users into handing over their recovery phrases through fake websites or support forms. Social engineering tactics might involve impersonating customer support or creating convincing scams to extract sensitive information. These attacks don't target the wallet hardware directly, but they exploit human behavior to bypass technical protections.

Counterfeit hardware wallets also pose a serious threat. In one 2026 example, a fake Ledger device closely resembled the genuine product but was programmed to collect sensitive data from its owner. Once connected to a computer, the counterfeit device would install malicious software to steal recovery phrases and other private information. These fake devices are often sold on unverified marketplaces and can look identical to authentic products.

User errors can also compromise wallet security. Taking photos of a recovery phrase or storing it online may seem harmless, but if those details are leaked, an attacker can rebuild the wallet and access the funds. Many users don't realize the importance of physical security for hardware wallets. Leaving a device in an unlocked bag or failing to secure it properly can allow thieves to attempt brute-force attacks on the PIN or exploit vulnerabilities in the device's software.

Despite these risks, hardware wallets remain one of the most secure options for storing cryptocurrency. By understanding the potential vulnerabilities and following best practices, users can significantly reduce the chances of becoming a victim. Always use authentic devices from verified sellers, avoid sharing recovery phrases and regularly check for firmware updates to address any known security issues.

The fine print

Firmware updates can prevent new vulnerable wallets, but cannot repair those already compromised by weak seed generation.

Frequently asked questions

How did the Coldcard hack compromise offline wallets?

A firmware flaw caused devices to use predictable seed generation, letting attackers calculate likely recovery phrases without physical access.

How much Bitcoin was stolen in the Coldcard breach?

Approximately 1,596 BTC was stolen from about 7,300 addresses by August 4, 2026, representing losses exceeding $100 million.

Why are counterfeit hardware wallets dangerous?

Fake devices can collect sensitive information like recovery phrases. They may look authentic but are designed to steal funds rather than protect them.

Based on reporting by Coinpaper, compiled by the Tradingbird newsroom. Published 05 Aug 2026, 14:27.
Topics: Security · Software
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