In 2026, a pivotal development in nuclear diplomacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia was announced, allowing the transfer of American civilian nuclear technology to the Kingdom. This news arrived at a tense time, as the US and Saudi Arabia launched coordinated air strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, responding to accusations that these groups had launched drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. Although the specific terms of the nuclear deal were not fully outlined, the timing of its announcement amidst military activity stirred fears over whether Saudi Arabia might one day use its nuclear program to develop its own weapons. The dual tracks of military action and nuclear diplomacy marked a significant moment in the evolving U.S.-Saudi relationship, particularly during what has come to be known as America’s Third Gulf War.
Saudi Arabia's Shift in Foreign Policy
The leadership shift in Saudi Arabia with the rise of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman in 2015 marked a new chapter in the country’s foreign policy. In March 2018, the Crown Prince made a bold public statement, declaring that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran did the same. This was a sharp break from the traditional position of the Kingdom, which had largely avoided any clear signs of nuclear aspirations. The Crown Prince's aggressive approach in regional affairs, including the decision to intervene in Yemen’s civil war in 2015, signaled a more confrontational strategy, particularly in relation to Iran. These developments were set against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s shifting priorities and the broader American engagement with Iran, particularly during the war that escalated under Trump’s second term.
Saudi Arabia has long had the financial resources to invest in nuclear technology, yet it has never possessed the necessary domestic scientific infrastructure to build weapons. In 1988, Saudi Arabia joined the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a step largely influenced by the United States. This pressure came after Saudi Arabia acquired nearly 50 Chinese CSS-2 missiles, replacing an earlier request for U.S. ballistic missiles that Washington had refused. The U.S. government’s response to this arms deal prompted Riyadh to join the NPT and to commit to not pursuing nuclear warheads for its missile systems. This precedent has served as a cornerstone of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, if any, would remain tightly constrained.
Historical Commitment to Non-Proliferation
For many years, the implicit security assurances offered by the United States have been a strong deterrent for Saudi Arabia, rendering the development of nuclear weapons unnecessary. These assurances have shielded the Kingdom from direct threats and provided a reliable defense umbrella. However, recent U.S. policy changes, particularly during the two terms of President Donald Trump, have cast doubt on the reliability of these guarantees. Trump’s actions during his first term, from 2016 to 2020, and his more recent involvement in the ongoing conflict with Iran have led Saudi Arabia to align more closely with American military activities. This has included direct participation in targeting groups tied to Iran in the region, reflecting a new strategic alignment shaped by the Trump administration.
Economic Logic Against Nuclear Weapons
Economic Considerations and Global Perception
Saudi Arabia's economy is heavily dependent on its role as the world’s swing oil producer and a key player within OPEC. Such a move could also discourage foreign investors who are essential to the country’s economic growth. In contrast, Iran has shown an ability to adapt to the impact of U.S. sanctions and has developed a certain degree of economic independence, despite its position in a more isolated geopolitical environment. This is partly due to the dominance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the economy, who have found ways to maintain revenue despite external pressures.
Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia's leadership has always placed a high value on a stable and predictable economy, with a strong dependence on international trade. A nuclear weapons program would undermine the Kingdom’s reputation for reliability and strategic caution. Although the Crown Prince announced in 2018 the construction of Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear research reactor, the long-term trajectory of the program remains uncertain. Historical patterns, U.S. influence, and economic considerations still appear to support a non-proliferation stance, yet the Crown Prince’s ambitions may test the limits of this status quo. The challenge lies in maintaining the delicate balance between strategic deterrence and economic pragmatism in a region shaped by increasingly volatile alliances and shifting great-power dynamics.
In 2018, Mohammad bin Salman was asked whether Saudi Arabia would ever develop a nuclear weapon. “We do not want to develop a nuclear bomb. But without doubt, if Iran developed one we would follow suit as soon as possible,” he told CBS, in an interview that sparked alarm across the Middle East. Eight years later, Saudi Arabia announced a historic deal with President Donald Trump to use American technology and expertise to develop a civilian nuclear programme. It arrived five months after Washington and Israel began a military campaign against Iran, with the stated aim of destroying any chance of Tehran developing a nuclear bomb. More than a week after announcing the deal though, its future is uncertain with Trump declaring that Saudi Arabia must recognize Israel in return.
The agreement allows for American companies to develop and operate commercial nuclear power plants on Saudi soil, and potentially includes grounds for a uranium-enrichment facility. For Saudi Arabia, the agreement follows two decades of stop-start negotiations. Progress has been hampered by two key American demands: the normalisation of relations with Israel and a safeguard against enrichment for nuclear weapons. While details on the agreement have not yet been made public, The Washington Post reported that the text did not mandate International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection, and also dropped the precondition that the Kingdom recognize Israel. But just 24 hours after the deal was signed, Trump appeared to backtrack - insisting that the deal remains “totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the very respected and successful Abraham Accords”, which established formal diplomatic ties between Israel and several Arab nations. It remains unclear whether the Kingdom will accept Trump’s demand.
Deal sets a ‘dangerous precedent’ Georgia Cole, an associate at Chatham House’s International Security Programme, said the deal sets a “really dangerous precedent” in the region regardless of whether it goes through. “The conflicts across the Middle East have raised so many questions about the reliability of US security guarantees,” she told The Independent. “In spite of assurances they have had in the past, Gulf states have seen themselves targeted, repeatedly — and it’s placed pressure on them to boost their own defence capabilities.” Because of this, Saudi’s attempts to procure a potential path towards nuclear weapons will act as an “additional pressure” that could encourage other states to look towards developing their own nuclear infrastructure, Ms Cole added. As the conflict with Iran continues to escalate, countries across the Middle East have already looked to build up their defence systems.
In September 2025, the Kingdom signed a mutual defence pact with Pakistan, the Southwest Asia and North Africa (SWANA) region’s only confirmed nuclear power. The agreement provides the Kingdom with a nuclear umbrella, where “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” But in seeking the US deal, Riyadh appears not to be assured that Islamabad can offer the protection it needs - in part due to political chaos in the country, where no prime minister has ever completed their term.