From concept to reality in four years
On July 1, 2025, the Indian Army officially established its first five Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), a core part of its evolving Cold Start strategy. Each IBG consists of approximately 5,000 personnel and is deployed along the eastern border in the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, where India faces increasing military pressure from China. These new units are part of the Eastern Command’s 17 Mountain Strike Corps and represent a major shift in how the Indian Army plans to conduct warfare.
General Bipin Rawat, who led the Indian Army in 2018 and later became the nation’s first Chief of Defense Staff, emphasized the need to modernize the army’s structures to keep up with the changing nature of warfare. He highlighted the failures of traditional formations during the 2001 Operation Parakram, when the Indian military’s slow mobilization led to a loss of strategic advantage. The IBGs are designed to operate with speed, mobilizing within 12 to 48 hours and integrating multiple elements, such as infantry, armor, artillery, logistics, and air defense. This allows each group to function as a self-sufficient, mobile force ready for rapid action.
Eastern focus amid growing Sino-Indian tensions
Although the idea of IBGs was originally aimed at addressing challenges posed by Pakistan—specifically its backing of cross-border terrorism and the ongoing conflict—the first five groups are now positioned to face China along the eastern Line of Actual Control (LAC). This strategic shift reflects India’s focus on responding to China’s growing military activity in the region. The 3,488-kilometer-long LAC is divided into three sectors, and the IBGs are now concentrated in the eastern sector, which includes the states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
The region’s mountainous terrain presents significant challenges for rapid troop movement, especially in high-altitude environments. The IBGs offer India the agility needed to move quickly into and occupy key terrain in the event of a Chinese military provocation. This is particularly important in areas where China holds an advantage in asymmetrical warfare, allowing it to act swiftly and unpredictably.
This decision aligns with India’s recent efforts to bolster its military presence in the region. The IBG model mirrors the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Combined Arms Brigades (CABs), introduced as part of the PLA’s 2017 military reforms. Since the 2020 standoff, the PLA has stationed CABs in Tibet, directly facing the Indian side in Eastern Ladakh. The adoption of similar structures by the Indian Army indicates a strategic move to level the playing field.
Bureaucratic delays and shifting timelines
Despite the urgency of the situation, the creation of IBGs faced significant delays due to bureaucratic hurdles. In January 2025, then-Army Chief Gen. Upendra Dwivedi acknowledged these challenges, stating, “We are hopeful that by 2025, we will either create this IBG or cancel this project completely.” Now that the government has officially sanctioned the formation of these units, the process to fully establish them across all sectors has begun.
The IBG model was previously tested and validated through exercises conducted in the Yol-based 9 Corps and the 17 Mountain Strike Corps. These trials allowed the army to refine the concept and address operational challenges. With the final approval from the government, the process to deploy IBGs across all sectors is now in motion. The full transition is expected to take a year, after which these units will be fully operational.
The 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine already outlined the need for India to form these combined forces in case of a conventional war, and the IBGs now make this doctrine a reality. These groups are intended to serve as the foundation of the army’s response during high-intensity conflicts, operating under the command of a combined arms operational headquarters. This shift marks a major transformation in how the Indian Army is preparing for the future of warfare.
The IBGs fit into a broader transformation of the Indian military, reflecting the evolving realities of modern warfare. This initiative effectively upgrades the Cold Start doctrine, a strategy first acknowledged by General Rawat in January 2017. Cold Start was originally developed in response to the failures of Operation Parakram in 2001, where the slow mobilization of strike forces led to a loss of surprise and allowed Pakistan to resort to nuclear signaling. With the IBGs now in place, India is better prepared to respond to any aggressive actions by China or Pakistan, ensuring that it can act decisively and maintain the initiative in future conflicts.