Ontario Power Generation anticipates the first BWRX-300 small modular reactor will be connected to the electricity grid by the end of 2030. The Darlington New Nuclear Project, located in Clarington, Ontario, is the first of four planned BWRX-300 reactors in the province. This step marks the beginning of Ontario's nuclear expansion using a foreign-designed reactor. The other three reactors are expected to be in operation by the mid-2030s, forming a key part of the province's strategy to diversify and expand its energy mix.
Uranium mined by Cameco will go through processing in Port Hope, Ontario, but enrichment will take place in the United States. Companies such as Orano from France and Urenco from Britain will provide enriched uranium, and the finished fuel assemblies will be manufactured in the U.S. These assemblies will then be transported back to Canada for use in the new reactors.
Shift from Canadian Self-Sufficiency
For decades, Canada developed the Candu reactor system to bypass dependence on foreign enrichment. The new reactors, however, rely on foreign suppliers, marking a shift from the original goal. A Library of Parliament background paper from 1993 stated the Candu system was designed to use natural uranium, avoiding the complex and costly process of enrichment. Mark Winfield, a professor at York University, said this change contradicts the foundation of Canada’s energy sovereignty strategy.
Winfield noted: 'It turns the original rationale for the Candu program completely on its head. The whole idea was, going back to the 1950s, that we would have an all-Canadian fuel supply chain that would not be subject to those kinds of geopolitical risks.' The decision to use imported enriched uranium is seen as a departure from the long-standing principles of energy independence and security that underpinned the development of the Candu system.
Ontario Energy Minister Stephen Lecce stated the province chose the American-Japanese BWRX-300 because no Canadian reactor is currently ready to generate electricity at the required scale. So we had to go global.' Lecce added that the decision to rely on foreign reactors was based on the need to start construction with the most advanced and least risky technology. Lecce emphasized that the province made this choice because, at present, no Canadian alternative exists that can meet the requirements for a grid-scale, commercially viable SMR project.
Global Supply Chain Concerns
Canada's Candu Monark reactor, a potential domestic alternative, is not an SMR and is still under review by the country's nuclear regulator. Lecce said the province has secured access to multiple uranium suppliers in the U.S., France, and Britain to mitigate supply risks. The province believes that having a diversified supplier base can reduce the risk of disruption in the event of a geopolitical conflict or economic standoff.
Experts like Winfield argue the project still exposes Canada to geopolitical vulnerabilities. Winfield said, 'You are at the mercy of whatever external geopolitical events may be occurring.' He added that relying on U.S. suppliers carries the risk of political leverage, especially with a president like Donald Trump, who has a history of using economic pressure for political gain. Winfield emphasized that geopolitical tensions could lead to export restrictions or other forms of supply disruption, which could threaten the stability of the new nuclear program.
While OPG claims having multiple suppliers in the U.S., France, and Britain creates a 'robust and resilient supply chain,' the core steps of enrichment and fabrication for the BWRX-300 remain in foreign hands. This shift from self-sufficiency to external reliance has sparked debate over the implications for Canada's energy strategy and national sovereignty. Critics say the new supply chain, while more diversified, does not eliminate the country's dependence on foreign nations for a critical component of its energy infrastructure.
Despite the province’s confidence in the new supply chain, concerns remain about long-term dependencies. Winfield emphasized that even with multiple suppliers, Canada's reliance on foreign enrichment and fabrication introduces risks that could impact the stability and security of its nuclear energy programs. The federal government, however, downplays these concerns, stating that foreign enrichment does not pose a significant supply risk in the short to medium-term.